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Abstract 
Firms with different ownership structures could be argued to have different levels of efficiency. Highly 
concentrated firms are expected to be more efficient as this type of ownership structure may alleviate the conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders. In Malaysia, public-listed firms have been found to have highly 
concentrated ownership structure. However, whether this evidence holds for every industry has not been 
established. Hence, the objective of this paper is to investigate whether there are variations in ownership 
structure and firm’s efficiency across sectors. To achieve this objective, the frequency distributions of ownership 
structure were calculated and firms’ efficiency scores for consumer products, industrial products, construction 
and trading/services sectors were measured. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) under the assumptions of 
constant returns to scale (CRS) and variable returns to scale (VRS) was employed to estimate firms’ efficiency 
scores. A sample of 156 firms listed on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) was selected using the 
stratified random sampling method. The findings have shown that there are variations in firm ownership 
structure and efficiency across sectors. 
Keywords: ownership structure, firm efficiency, DEA 
1. Introduction 
Firm ownership structure in Malaysia has changed as business organizations flourish and the national economy 
grows. In addition, it has also changed due to economic transition, industrialization and privatization policies 
implemented by the government over the past four decades. As a result, size of firms have expanded and caused 
susbstantial changes in the dispersion, redistribution and concentration of ownership structure. Ramli (2010), for 
instance, has found that ownership structure in Malaysia is concentrated and large shareholders are in control. He 
found that the largest shareholders or a shareholder group owns around 40% of companies’ paid-up capital. In 
addition, according to the study by Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (2000) on corporations in nine East Asian 
countries, Malaysia has the third highest concentration of control after Thailand and Indonesia. 
In general, firms with different ownership structure are argued to have different levels of efficiency. Highly 
concentrated firms will be more efficient because this type of ownership structure may alleviate the conflict of 
interests between managers and shareholders. This statement is mainly grounded in the very well-known 
principal-agency problem model by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The principal-agency problem argues that 
managerial share-ownership may reduce managerial incentives for privileges, expropriating shareholders’ wealth 
or engaging in other sub-optimal activities. This subsequently helps in aligning the interest of managers and 
shareholders and consequently lowers agency costs and increases firm value. Regarding diffused shareholding, 
this kind of ownership structure does not provide adequate control to the shareholders due to the lack of capacity 
and motivation to monitor management decisions. Hence, the model predicts that larger managerial ownership 
stakes should lead to better firm performance.  
The study by Abdul Samad (2002) reveals the existence of a high concentration of ownership in Malaysia. His 
study on the public-listed companies in Malaysia found that the means of shareholdings of the largest 
shareholders and the five largest shareholders to be about 30% and 60%, respectively. This finding indicates that 
companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) are less diffused but are dominated by companies with 
concentrated shareholders, typically families or government-owned or promoted institutions.  
Therefore, in view of the previous evidence of high ownership concentration of firms in Malaysia, this study 
attempts to investigate the variation in ownership structure and the variation in efficiency of the public-listed 
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firms in Malaysia. By focusing our investigation on the variations in ownership structure and efficiency across 
sectors, we expect to gain a greater understanding of the actual scenario of firms’ ownership structure and 
efficiency in Malaysia and to ascertain whether the efficiency of public listed firms in Malaysia differs across 
sectors. By conducting our analysis across sectors, this study hopes to add new and meaningful contributions to 
the previous literature on firms’ efficiency and ownership structure.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a brief literature review, followed by the 
methodology, discussion of results, policy implications and conclusion. 
2. Literature Review 
This review provides a brief discussion of the literature on ownership structure and firm efficiency and firm 
performance. A firm’s ownership structure is an important driver of its efficiency and profitability (Church & 
Ware, 2000). A firm which operates at a high efficiency level can normally be associated with higher 
performance or profitability. Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1988) have suggested that firm performance is likely 
to vary across industries.  
In general, a firm’s ownership structure can differ along two main dimensions. First, the degree of ownership 
concentration, which refers to whether ownership of a firm is more or less-dispersed. Second, the nature of the 
owners, which refers to who owns the majority stake in the firm. Firms’ ownership structure can significantly 
influence firms’ efficiency, such as through its influence on the decision making process. Specifically, a firm’s 
ownership structure determines its capital structure. Furthermore, a firm’s capital structure influences its 
investment and growth behavior. Both factors then become the major driving force of future returns to a firm and 
eventually affect firm efficiency.  
Furthermore, various researchers such as Williamson (1964), Marris (1964), Galbraith (1967), Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978), Salami (2011), Su and He (2012), Bejan and Bidian (2012) have argued that ownership 
structure has important implications for firm efficiency and strategic development. Based on the 
principal-agency problem model, Jensen and Meckling (1976) have argued that a firm’s performance will be 
negatively related to low ownership concentration and positively related to high ownership concentration. This 
can be explained by the concept of diffused shareholding. Salami (2011) has discovered two important findings. 
First, most of the listed companies have high ownership concentration in structure; and second, corporate 
governance structure is an important element in the investment strategies of these companies. These two findings 
appear to show some positive relationship with corporate investment efficiency. Thus, the study shows that there 
exists a positive relationship amongst the share-ownership structure, corporate governance structure, and 
corporate profitability.  
In contrast, Morck et al. (1988) believed that concentrated ownership may be associated negatively with firm 
performance where the overall effect on firm value may be positive at low concentration but negative at high 
concentration levels. Similarly, Su and He (2012) found similar results. Their study of 744 public-listed 
manufacturing firms in China for the period 1999 to 2006 found that firm efficiency, estimated using stochastic 
frontier analysis and data envelopment analysis, is negatively related to state ownership but positively related to 
public and employee share-ownership. They also found that the relationship between ownership concentration 
and firm efficiency is U-shaped, illustrating that the largest shareholder may engage in tunneling activities. As 
the identity of the largest shareholder changes from government or government-controlled legal entity to other 
types of legal entity, firm efficiency significantly improves. This indicates that firms with more independent 
board are more efficient. This evidence supports the idea that board of directors can be an effective internal 
governance mechanism.  
In addition, the study by Iannotta, Nocera and Sironi (2006) have divided the European banking industry 
ownership classification into privately-owned banks (POBs), mutual banks (MBs), and government-owned 
banks (GOBs). Their findings have shown that ownership concentration does not significantly affect profitability. 
The study by Altanbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) uses a variety of approaches to model cost and profit 
efficiencies for different ownership types in the German Banking market did not find strong evidence in support 
of the proposition that private ownership is associated with better firm performance and enterprise efficiency 
than state ownership. They found that privately-owned banks are less efficient than their mutual and public 
sector counterparts. Their inefficiency measures indicate that private banks have slight cost and profit 
disadvantages over their mutual and public sector competitors.  
Meanwhile, another group of researchers such as Jensen and Meckling (1976), Demsetz (1983), Fama and 
Jensen (1983), and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) have claimed the irrelevancy of ownership structure. For instance, 
Demsetz (1983) argued that there should be no systematic relationship between variations in ownership structure 
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and variations in firm performance. Thomsen and Pedersen (2000) have argued that the effect of concentrated or 
dispersed ownership on firm performance will be difficult to predict unless one controls for the firm’s capital 
structure choice. In other words, the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance also 
depends on the identity of the major shareholders. Different types of shareholders have different investment 
priorities and preferences for how to deal with principal-agency problem. Even though these differences can be 
solved in board meetings when consensuses are achieved, the implementation will be executed by the managers 
who might have different objectives from the shareholders. While shareholders’ objective is to get high profit, 
managers’ objectives may be getting high profit, good working environment, good salary, and improvement of 
workers’ welfare.  
Furthermore, other studies such as Ang, Hauser and Lauterbach (1997) and Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) for 
instance, have used the second criterion in classifying ownership structure. They distinguished between non-owner 
managed firms, firms controlled by concerns, firms controlled by a family, and firms controlled by a group of 
individuals (partners). The latter found that dispersed ownership and non-owner manager promotes firm 
performance, estimated as the actual net income of the firm divided by the optimal net income given by the firm’s 
inputs. These findings can be supported by the studies of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
which have demonstrated that percentage ownership appears insufficient for describing the control structure. For 
instance, two firms with identical overall percentage ownership by large blockholders are likely to have different 
control organizations, depending on the identity of the large blockholders. They also argued that the relation 
between percentage ownership and firm performance is non-linear. Therefore, as stressed by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), the implication is that, it is important, not only how much equity a shareholder owns, but also who this 
shareholder is, that is, a private person, financial institution, non-financial institution enterprise, multi-national 
corporation or government. 
In Malaysia, according to Thillainathan (1999), the controlling shareholder (i.e. those holding more than 50% 
ownership) through the pyramid structure is common. The controlling shareholders, either individuals/families 
or firms, are in the position to expropriate minority interests using their dominant voting right. Thillainathan’s 
findings proved that large ownership or ownership concentration may contribute to deficiencies in corporate 
governance. Furthermore, the study by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) on Japanese firms used both measures of 
ownership structure. Their first measure is ownership by five largest blockholders, which does not distinguish 
shareholders’ identities. The second and third measures are ownership by financial institutions and ownership by 
non-financial institutions, where each measure is equal to the percentage of a company’s outstanding shares held 
by Japanese financial and non-financial companies. Their results show a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and financial performance, which is consistent with agency theory prediction. This finding 
suggests that large Japanese investors can operate as effective monitors of top executives in other firms. In 
addition, their results also indicate that shareholders identity matters. Their conclusion is based on the fact that 
redistribution effects (transfer of profits from profitable firm to less profitable firm) was found only when they 
examined the ownership of financial and non-financial firms. Such a result is consistent with the notion that 
distinct classes of shareholders differ in their investment objectives and capacities to influence corporate 
behavior (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000).  
Gedajlovic and Shapiro (2002) have followed Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) method. They modelled ownership 
structure, first, as an endogenous variable and second, they examined two different measures of ownership 
structure: (a) the fraction of shares owned by insiders (top management, CEO, board members) and (b) fraction 
of shares owned by important outside investors. Their findings indicate that there exists a linear positive 
relationship between profitability and ownership structure. Furthermore, their results suggests that the greater the 
degree to which shares are concentrated in the hands of outside or inside shareholders, the more effectively 
management behavior is monitored and disciplined, leading to better performance. In addition, their results prove 
the endogeneity of ownership structure, where profitability is a positive determinant of ownership structure. 
There exists evidence that superior firm performance leads to an increase in the value of stock options owned by 
management or large shareholders, which if exercised, would increase their share ownership.  
Therefore, based on these different views and findings, there seems to be inconclusive evidence on the 
relationship between ownership structure and firm efficiency. This situation has captured our interest to 
investigate the issue further. In this study, specifically, we consider the effect of ownership concentration on firm 
performance, specifically on firm efficiency. In addition, since the majority of the studies on the relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance have been on firms in the developed countries, our study 
aims to extend previous knowledge by examining this relationship in a developing country. Malaysia is a 
developing country which provides a rich setting for exploring this issue further. To the best of our knowledge, 
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this kind of study has not been done extensively in Malaysia. Amongst the few studies on the issue in the 
Malaysian setting include Abdul Samad (2002), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Chang and Shazali (2005), and 
Faizah (2006).  
3. Methodology 
This study was carried out using secondary data from a sample of 156 firms which were listed on the KLSE. 
Unbalanced panel data of listed firms over the period 2000 through 2010 were used in our analysis. The sample 
firms were selected using the stratified random sampling method. Data were gathered from Datastream and also 
from published reports of the selected companies. The final sample consists of firms from the consumer products, 
industrial products, construction, trading/services and properties sectors. Other sectors were dropped because the 
required data on output and inputs were not available for all the years of the study.  
Ownership structure is measured using three concentrations of equity ownership namely, one-ownership 
concentration ratio (CR1), two-ownership concentration ratio (CR2), and four-ownership concentration ratio 
(CR4). The calculations of these concentrations are based on the analysis of shareholdings section disclosed in 
the firms’ annual reports. This operationalization of ownership concentration concept has been widely used in 
previous researches such as by McConnel and Servaes (1990), Leech and Leahy (1991), and Claessens et al. 
(1999). Meanwhile, firm efficiency score is measured by the non-parametric method, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA). The DEA approach was chosen over the Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) which is a 
parametric approach since the former does not require the functional form and the distribution type to be 
assumed in advance. The DEA was originally developed by Farrel (1957) and subsequently extended and 
reformulated by Charnes, Fooper and Rhodes (1978). The DEA method by Charnes et al. is considered suitable 
for this study since it measures the efficiency of a micro unit relative to the efficiency of all the other micro units, 
assuming that all micro units are on or below the frontier. In the DEA method, constant returns to scale (CRS) 
and variable returns to scale (VRS) were employed to estimate firms’ efficiency scores. The estimated model for 
technical efficiency is illustrated by Equation (1). 
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where DMU0 represents one of the n DMUs under evaluation, and iox and roy are the ith input and rth output for 
DMU0, respectively. j are unknown weights, where j = 1, 2, …n represents the number of DMUs. The optimal 
value or *  represents the distance of the firm from the efficient frontier. Therefore, the most efficient firm 
will have *  = 1 and the inefficient firm will have * < 1.  
One of the most important steps in the estimation of efficiency is in the selection of input and output variables to 
be used in the DEA model. Physical measures and monetary measures are common types of input/output 
variables. We used monetary measures for three reasons. First, it is difficult to obtain variable information in 
physical units. Second, following Battese and Coelli (1995), it is preferable to use monetary measures to measure 
efficiency at the firm level since a firm is often engaged in many different activities. Third, using monetary 
measures may capture more information compared to physical measures. Thus, consistent with Feroz, Kim and 
Raab (2003), we chose two conventional input variables (wages and salaries as a measure of labour expenses, 
expenses on land, building and equipment, and interest expenses and one conventional output variable (revenue) 
in our DEA model. 
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4. Discussion of Results 
Four sectors, namely consumer products, industrial products, construction, and trading/services were selected as 
the unit of analysis. The number of firms in the sample is determined by the proportion of firms in each sector to 
the entire firms registered on the KLSE. Firms in the trading/services sector (58 firms or 37.2%) represent the 
highest proportion of firms in the sample, followed by the industrial products sector (57 firms or 36.5%), 
consumer products (29 firms or 18.6%), and construction (12 firms or 7.7%).  
Our investigation of ownership structure data reveals that the concentration of equity ownership in the 156 
public-listed firms varies widely. The outcomes of the investigation are shown in Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3. 
Table 1 shows that industrial products, construction and trading/services have the highest share controlled by the 
single largest shareholder at the percentage shareholder range of 11 – 30%. There are 69 firms (44.23%) of the 
total firms that fall within this range across the sectors. Meanwhile, the consumer products sector has the single 
largest shareholder in the percentage shareholder range of 31 – 50%, the second largest ownership range. The 
total number of firms in this percentage shareholder range is 15 firms (51.70%) of total firms in this sector.  
Meanwhile, Table 2 shows that highest share percentage controlled by the top two largest shareholders falls 
within the 31 – 50% range. In general, industrial products and trading/services sectors have the highest 
percentage shareholder distribution in this range. The total number of firms in this range is 57 firms (36.54%). 
Of the total firms that fall within this percentage range, the industrial product sector represents 40.35% of the 
firms, construction 10.53%, and trading/ services 31.58%. The highest share percentage for consumer products 
sector is in the 51 – 70% range. There are 13 firms which fall in this category, which constitute 44.83% of firms 
in this sector.  
Extending the shareholding analysis to the top four largest shareholders, the study found that 69 of the 156 firms 
or 44.23% of the sample firms have between 31 – 50% of shares controlled by the four largest shareholders 
(shown in Table 3). Only one firm, in trading/services has more than 90% of shares in the hands of the four 
largest shareholders. 
 
Table 1. Frequency distribution of ownership structure (Share controlled by the single largest shareholders) 
Sector of Firms Ownership (%) Total 
≤ 10  11 – 30  31 – 50  51 – 70  71 – 90  
Consumer Products 1 9 15 4 0 29 
Industrial Products 2 28 20 7 0 57 
Construction 1 8 3 0 0 12 
Trading/Services 6 24 18 9 1 58 
Total 10 69 56 20 1 156 
 
Table 2. Frequency distribution of ownership structure (Share controlled by top two largest shareholders) 
Sector of Firms Ownership (%) Total 
≤ 10 11 – 30  31 – 50  51 – 70  71 – 90  
Consumer Products 0 3 10 13 3 29 
Industrial Products 1 16 23 14 3 57 
Construction 0 4 6 2 0 12 
Trading/Services 0 17 18 18 5 58 
Total 1 40 57 47 11 156 
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Table 3. Frequency distribution of ownership structure (Share controlled by top four largest shareholders) 
Sector of Firms Ownership (%) Total 
11 – 30  31 – 50  51 – 70  71 – 90  > 90 
Consumer Products 1 9 15 4 0 29 
Industrial Products 2 28 20 7 0 57 
Construction 1 8 3 0 0 12 
Trading/Services 6 24 18 9 1 58 
Total 10 69 56 20 1 156 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 shows the descriptive statistic of estimated efficiency score for all sectors. Comparisons 
across sectors are made so as to highlight the variation in scores across different industries within the KLSE. 
EFF1INCRS and EFF1INVRS refer to efficiency score assuming CRS and VRS, respectively. It is clear that the 
mean of estimated efficiency score of EFF1INCRS for trading/services, at 0.032, is the highest compared to the 
other sectors. The maximum value of estimated EFF1INCRS score for consumer products and trading/services 
recorded the extreme value of efficiency, or 1.000. At the same time, trading/services sector also recorded the 
lowest minimum value of estimated EFF1INCRS score. Meanwhile, the mean of estimated EFF1INVRS scores 
are between 0.187 and 0.222. Consumer products, industrial products and trading/services sectors recorded the 
highest maximum value of EFF1INVRS scores, or 1.000. The lowest minimum value of EFF1INVRS score is 
recorded by the consumer products sector. The comparison between sectors is made to gain a greater 
understanding of the actual scenario of firms’ ownership structure and efficiency in Malaysia and to explore their 
variations across sectors. The difference in efficiencies may be due to the different ownership structure in each 
sector. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistic of estimated efficiency score  
Variable Sector of Firm Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
EFF1INCRS Consumer Products 0.014 0.088 0.00057 1.000 
 Industrial Products 0.017 0.062 0.00075 0.527 
 Construction 0.016 0.018 0.00187 0.119 
 Trading/Services 0.032 0.107 0.00005 1.000 
EFF1INVRS Consumer Products 0.190 0.179 0.004 1.000 
 Industrial Products 0.222 0.191 0.008 1.000 
 Construction 0.207 0.163 0.013 0.642 
  Trading/Services 0.187 0.218 0.005 1.000 
 
In summary, our findings have portrayed the variation in firm ownership structures and efficiencies across 
sectors. Based on Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3, either industrial products or trading/services has the top largest 
shareholders in each bracket of ownership concentration. These results are consistent with the estimates of 
efficiency score in Table 4 where industrial products and trading/services sectors have the highest score under 
CRS and VRS assumptions, respectively . Therefore, based on this evidence, it seems that ownership structure 
may influence firms’ efficiency. In other words, a sector which has a high concentration of ownership may tend 
to be efficient.  
In the present study, the distribution of ownership is classified into three categories: the share concentration of 
the single largest, the top two largest, and the top four largest shareholders in each sector. In the first category, 
the largest proportion of firms in the industrial products, construction, and trading/services have a share 
concentration in the 11 – 30% range. However, the largest number of firms in consumer products has a share 
concentration in the 31 – 50% range. The picture changes for the second and third category of ownership. The 
highest proportion of firms in the industrial products, construction, and trading/services have a share 
concentration in the 31 – 50% range. On the other hand, the largest proportion of consumer product firms has a 
share concentration in the 51 – 70% range.  
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5. Policy Implications  
Based on the results of the analyses presented and discussed in the previous sections, this study has been able to 
provide a clearer picture of the relationship between firms’ ownership structure and efficiency in Malaysia. The 
findings of this study provide support for the hypothesis that firm efficiency is largely affected by its pattern of 
ownership structure. Firm efficiency is caused mainly by high concentration of ownership structure. Since large 
shareholders are a common phenomenon in Malaysian firms, this would be an important issue to be pondered by 
the government in their pursuit to strengthen corporate governance practices. Although the evidence implies that 
Malaysian firms may generate higher efficiency through large ownership, consistent with Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), this result is in contrast with findings of Burkart, Gromb, Panunzi (1997) and Hill and Snell (1988) who 
argued that over concentration of ownership may prove to be an obstacle in exploiting growth opportunities as 
well as discouraging innovation and management initiative, when such situation require greater provision of 
capital and risk taking. Further, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have argued that in corporate systems with a high 
ownership concentration, the minority shareholders may suffer risk expropriation of wealth from majority 
shareholders. Such expropriation merely aggravates the agency problem and reduces the firm’s market value.  
Through time, Malaysia’s economic strength is becoming rooted in its industrial base and it is currently moving 
to a higher value-added service-based economy. As the Malaysian economy moves towards becoming a 
high-income economy, Malaysian firms face many key challenges in their quest to enhance business activities 
and profitability. Consequently, Malaysian firms need to be strengthened in terms of their corporate governance 
practices so as to ensure efficiency improvements. Their improved performance will subsequently help the 
country achieve high economic performance.    
6. Conclusion 
Ownership structure and firm efficiency are regarded as important fundamental issues in corporate governance. 
The literature on the effect of ownership structure has devoted much attention on firm performance but paid 
scant attention to firm efficiency. Therefore, our study of firm efficiency across different types of ownership 
structure attempts to fill the gap in the literature by providing new evidence on firm efficiency in Malaysia. As 
estimated using DEA model, this study has shown that firms with high ownership concentration appear to 
experience a higher efficiency compared to firms with low ownership concentration. Therefore, the government 
should ensure that Malaysian firms enhance their corporate governance practices in order to improve efficiency.  
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